

1 Tuesday, 7 October 2014
 2 (9.30 am)
 3 THE CORONER: Mr Barr, just before we start, I don't know if
 4 you have seen the document just requesting that the
 5 ambassador to Algeria be called. If you haven't, it can
 6 certainly be made available to you. But I think it
 7 might help me if there was anything that you wanted to
 8 say about that in writing, I don't mean orally, just so
 9 that I can consider whether or not we might ask for
 10 a statement. But could you just give that some
 11 attention?
 12 MR BARR: Sir, yes, certainly we will make some written
 13 submissions as soon as we can.
 14 THE CORONER: Thank you very much.
 15 MS DOLAN: Sir, the first witness today is Mr Green.
 16 MR DAVID GREEN (sworn)
 17 Questions from MS DOLAN
 18 MS DOLAN: Good morning, Mr Green.
 19 **A. Good morning.**
 20 Q. I know that you have prepared a statement about some of
 21 the discussions you had with Stephen and the
 22 communications from him when he was going to Algeria and
 23 in Algeria?
 24 **A. Yes.**
 25 Q. I know you were going to try and memorise that. Have
 Page 1

1 you memorised that and would you like to give it or
 2 would you prefer me to ask you questions?
 3 **A. I think I would prefer you to ask me questions.**
 4 Q. I have it in front of me. I think Stephen told you who
 5 first recruited him for the project?
 6 **A. Yes, it was Nick Hitch.**
 7 Q. And who did you understand was Stephen's manager in
 8 Algeria?
 9 **A. It was Nick Hitch, both in Manilla and in Algeria.**
 10 **Stephen first went to Manilla in the Philippines, there**
 11 **was a team there doing detailed design of the -- for the**
 12 **Compression Project.**
 13 Q. And then he moved on to doing that in Algeria?
 14 **A. Yes, he started there in about June of 2011. He was**
 15 **a contractor at that time. And then he started in**
 16 **Algeria, his first time in Algeria was in December 2011,**
 17 **he was there over Christmas. He had his Christmas**
 18 **dinner with us beforehand.**
 19 Q. And I think you were concerned at the time because of
 20 the security situation in Algeria?
 21 **A. Well, I was concerned because of the civil war that had**
 22 **taken place against the Islamists and, yes, I was**
 23 **concerned about him starting there and then subsequent**
 24 **to that I believe I said in my statement that he had to**
 25 **make a presentation in the city of Algiers to the**
 Page 2

1 **government on health and safety and he was taken around**
 2 **with a guard but the guard was unarmed. So that**
 3 **concerned us as well.**
 4 Q. I think it was your understanding that Stephen wasn't
 5 given any special training particular to the situation
 6 in Algeria?
 7 **A. No, he wasn't, no. That's my understanding. My**
 8 **understanding from other BP people, well people who have**
 9 **gone -- who might have gone on BP locations that there**
 10 **are certain countries which are considered hostile and**
 11 **you are given special training for that. Stephen wasn't**
 12 **given any such training.**
 13 Q. I think in January 2013 before Stephen left England,
 14 I think he left on 8 January, you spoke to him about the
 15 situation in Mali?
 16 **A. I did. I was concerned about what was happening in**
 17 **Mali. There was an insurrection there. Both the**
 18 **Al Qaeda and the Tuareg minority in the north of the**
 19 **country were in an alliance and were driving south.**
 20 **I think they had taken Timbuktu or somewhere like that**
 21 **and the French had to intervene and were opposing the**
 22 **insurrectionists. So I was concerned about that so**
 23 **I spoke to him on the night before he left,**
 24 **on January 8. He stayed at our house and I discussed it**
 25 **with him.**
 Page 3

1 Q. And I think he told you Mali was some distance from
 2 where In Amenas was but mentioned the proximity to
 3 Libya?
 4 **A. He did, yes. He said that -- yes, he tried to reassure**
 5 **me saying, well Mali was some distance away and -- but**
 6 **the Libyan border, however, which was in chaos due to**
 7 **the breakdown of government was close by.**
 8 Q. I think Stephen told you the site was protected by the
 9 Algerian army?
 10 **A. Yes, he did. Well he tried to reassure me and say, you**
 11 **know, the site is protected by the Algerian army, but**
 12 **I later found that the army was actually based in the**
 13 **town of In Amenas which is about 40 odd miles from the**
 14 **site.**
 15 Q. I think Stephen made some reference to security issues
 16 in some of his work books?
 17 **A. He did, yes.**
 18 Q. And you have looked through those notebooks?
 19 **A. Yes, well, my son Nicholas, I've got poor eyesight, my**
 20 **son Nicholas who's in court today he went through the**
 21 **notebooks. We got these notebooks brought back from**
 22 **Algeria. They are the same ones which were in the bag**
 23 **which was mentioned on Friday. It was handed over by**
 24 **the US Air Force to the police. Yes, we saw these**
 25 **notebooks and we went through them and picked out some**
 Page 4

<p>1 relevant entries in his notebooks.</p> <p>2 Q. And I think one of the things you noted was a risk</p> <p>3 review written by Stephen about the Japanese Gas</p> <p>4 Corporation?</p> <p>5 A. That's right. That must have been in Manilla in 2011</p> <p>6 and I believe he wrote something of the order is that</p> <p>7 JGC, that's the Japanese Gas Company, has no plans for</p> <p>8 political instability and no plans for terrorist</p> <p>9 activity. JGC are the prime contractor for the</p> <p>10 compressor project.</p> <p>11 Q. But that was something he wrote in July 2011?</p> <p>12 A. Correct.</p> <p>13 Q. And did you see any further reference to that later on</p> <p>14 when actually he went to Algeria?</p> <p>15 A. No, I haven't seen that.</p> <p>16 Q. Then I think in July 2012 he made some comment in his</p> <p>17 notebook about the baggage checks?</p> <p>18 A. Yes, there were two things. Well there's one which is</p> <p>19 in the statement and there's another one which we found</p> <p>20 subsequently when we did another search last week and on</p> <p>21 Sunday, we found another reference, which Mr Owen-Thomas</p> <p>22 has got, but the one that was on in July of 2012</p> <p>23 referred to someone who came in and his -- there was</p> <p>24 a problem with the badge, the man couldn't speak French</p> <p>25 or English and his signature I believe, it -- his</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 5</p>	<p>1 It may have been that.</p> <p>2 Q. But there wasn't any more to explain?</p> <p>3 A. No, I'm just speculating on that.</p> <p>4 MS DOLAN: Thank you, Mr Green. I have no more to ask you</p> <p>5 but ...?</p> <p>6 A. Okay, thank you.</p> <p>7 Questions from MR OWEN-THOMAS</p> <p>8 MR OWEN-THOMAS: Mr Green, I understand there are one or two</p> <p>9 supplementary matters you wish to add since your</p> <p>10 statement.</p> <p>11 A. Yes.</p> <p>12 Q. Perhaps I could ask you about those now.</p> <p>13 A. Okay.</p> <p>14 Q. Whilst we are discussing the notebooks I understand you</p> <p>15 noted an entry on 14 July when a person refused to have</p> <p>16 a bag searched?</p> <p>17 A. That's correct and I think -- this is something that we</p> <p>18 found out on Sunday when Nicholas looked through. There</p> <p>19 was somebody refused a bag search and disciplinary</p> <p>20 action was carried out against that person. Is that</p> <p>21 correct?</p> <p>22 Q. That is what the entry says indeed. And on 17 July?</p> <p>23 A. I don't recall that one perhaps you could read that out</p> <p>24 for me.</p> <p>25 Q. An entry which reads:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 7</p>
<p>1 signature didn't match that on the badge. I believe</p> <p>2 that is what I said in the statement.</p> <p>3 Q. Something about it wasn't his signature on the pass?</p> <p>4 A. That's right. But he was still allowed in.</p> <p>5 Q. I think Stephen also recorded the same thing we have</p> <p>6 heard from other witnesses about some relatives of the</p> <p>7 hunger strikers being allowed into the camp?</p> <p>8 A. Yes, that was in late November 2012, he was at</p> <p>9 a security meeting, it says security meeting in the</p> <p>10 notebook, and there was the issue that there were</p> <p>11 relatives on camp and that the Gendarmes had made the</p> <p>12 expats stay in their accommodation while the relatives</p> <p>13 were in the camp.</p> <p>14 Q. I think there was another entry in December 2012 saying</p> <p>15 "Activity on the periphery is the area of concern" but</p> <p>16 no further explanation of what that referred to?</p> <p>17 A. Yes, well, I -- yes, I think at the top of the page, and</p> <p>18 I'll check with Mr Owen-Thomas, I think it was with</p> <p>19 "M Cobb", who I think was probably Mark Cobb, a meeting</p> <p>20 which he chaired and I believe, from what I have heard</p> <p>21 since I believe there was a gentleman either yesterday</p> <p>22 or -- no, I think it was yesterday, he -- Gary Rose was</p> <p>23 it? Yes. He was talking about there was going to be</p> <p>24 Gendarme activity or military activity round the</p> <p>25 perimeters of the CPF or further out into the desert.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 6</p>	<p>1 "JGC fly camp. Security needs to be advised not to</p> <p>2 let visitors into the camp. Follow up with Paul."</p> <p>3 Is that an entry you noticed?</p> <p>4 A. Yes, that's right and we assumed the Paul there was</p> <p>5 Paul Morgan.</p> <p>6 Q. And then, 4 November, I understand you saw an entry in</p> <p>7 respect of guards causing some trouble?</p> <p>8 A. Correct.</p> <p>9 Q. Including vandalising the site, some petty theft and</p> <p>10 matters of that nature?</p> <p>11 A. That is correct.</p> <p>12 Q. In addition, Mr Green, you have heard me ask questions</p> <p>13 of Mr Collins in respect of your phone call with Bob</p> <p>14 Dudley --</p> <p>15 A. Yes. Before you go on, I think there was an entry on</p> <p>16 12 January 2013, Mr Owen-Thomas. Is that correct?</p> <p>17 Q. There was indeed relating to Mali.</p> <p>18 A. Correct.</p> <p>19 Q. Stephen noted "Increased security, increased exercise</p> <p>20 due to activity in Mali."</p> <p>21 A. That's right.</p> <p>22 Q. Is that the entry?</p> <p>23 A. Yes, that's another notebook entry, yes.</p> <p>24 Q. Yes, sorry, I was asking about your phone call on</p> <p>25 18 January of January 2013 with Mr Dudley.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 8</p>

2 (Pages 5 to 8)

<p>1 A. Yes, that's right.</p> <p>2 Q. Perhaps you could tell Her Majesty's Coroner about that</p> <p>3 conversation?</p> <p>4 A. Well, fine. We were informed of Stephen's death by the</p> <p>5 family liaison officer about lunchtime on the 18th and</p> <p>6 during the afternoon I spoke to my contact at the BP</p> <p>7 crisis centre and requested that Mr Dudley phone. I was</p> <p>8 later informed that he would phone that evening and he</p> <p>9 did. Clearly he obviously gave his sympathy and</p> <p>10 condolences and he told me that a very senior HR person</p> <p>11 would be taking charge and looking after the families.</p> <p>12 I also spoke to him about the possibility of BP giving</p> <p>13 some funds to a charity that we were going to set up in</p> <p>14 Stephen's name and he said that they would look into</p> <p>15 that and I must add they have in fact donated a sizeable</p> <p>16 sum to the charity from the company and from employees.</p> <p>17 And also I spoke to Mr Dudley about would BP be</p> <p>18 doing an investigation into what happened, and Mr Dudley</p> <p>19 told me that BP would do an investigation and it would</p> <p>20 make the report public. And I had hoped that they would</p> <p>21 follow the example of Statoil, but that has not</p> <p>22 happened.</p> <p>23 Q. Thank you, Mr Green. I think the following day on</p> <p>24 19 January you spoke to Alastair Burt?</p> <p>25 A. No, I actually spoke to Alastair Burt on the Friday</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 9</p>	<p>1 victims to the In Amenas hospital and I understand from</p> <p>2 the police that he was in contact with senior figures in</p> <p>3 In Amenas town.</p> <p>4 And subsequently later that day Alastair Burt phoned</p> <p>5 me a second time in the evening and told me that all</p> <p>6 victims had been taken to the hospital in In Amenas.</p> <p>7 However, this was incorrect in the case of Stephen, that</p> <p>8 the Algerians mistook him for a terrorist and his -- he</p> <p>9 was not identified for another ten days after that, so</p> <p>10 that -- okay. So -- which caused further distress, but</p> <p>11 that's the -- that's my knowledge of what the British</p> <p>12 ambassador did in In Amenas.</p> <p>13 Q. Mr Green, were you told anything about the British</p> <p>14 ambassador speaking directly to the military?</p> <p>15 A. No, I only heard about that when Stephen McFaul gave his</p> <p>16 evidence last week.</p> <p>17 MR OWEN-THOMAS: Thank you, Mr Green. There may be some</p> <p>18 questions from other people. If you wait there we'll</p> <p>19 see.</p> <p>20 Questions from MS GOLLOP</p> <p>21 MS GOLLOP: Mr Green, it is Katie Gollop here asking</p> <p>22 questions on Mrs Green's behalf. I just wanted to</p> <p>23 clarify with you Stephen's attitude to risk. What she</p> <p>24 told us in the statement she read out originally was</p> <p>25 that Stephen took a very careful approach to weighing up</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 11</p>
<p>1 evening, that would be the 18th, and I had previously</p> <p>2 spoken to my MP because I was very concerned that it had</p> <p>3 been reported by the police as a result of an interview</p> <p>4 with Stephen McFaul that Stephen -- my son -- was lying</p> <p>5 in the desert unretrieved and I was very upset about</p> <p>6 this and I rang my MP at Westminster and spoke to him</p> <p>7 and asked him that I did not want Stephen, my son</p> <p>8 Stephen, to be lying out in the desert. And he said</p> <p>9 then he would get in touch with Alastair Burt.</p> <p>10 Alastair Burt rang me on Friday evening and I expressed</p> <p>11 my concern to him. The following morning I got a call</p> <p>12 from the family liaison officer and he said that the</p> <p>13 British ambassador would arrive in In Amenas at about</p> <p>14 lunchtime on the 19th.</p> <p>15 Then subsequently I spoke to Alastair Burt again</p> <p>16 twice on the Sunday. And the first phone call he said</p> <p>17 that -- he rang me -- he said that the ambassador was in</p> <p>18 In Amenas. At that time he didn't say it was -- where in</p> <p>19 In Amenas, whether it was the town or the site.</p> <p>20 I assumed that he was at the site, but I have</p> <p>21 subsequently learned from the police that he never got</p> <p>22 to the site. He got to the town. But he said that the</p> <p>23 ambassador was carrying substantial weight with the</p> <p>24 local people, with the local authorities and those in</p> <p>25 charge and he was organising the transport of the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 10</p>	<p>1 the pros and cons of the countries in which he went to</p> <p>2 work. Would you agree with that?</p> <p>3 A. I think so, yes. He told me in fact that he would never</p> <p>4 work in Iraq or Nigeria, for example.</p> <p>5 Q. And it follows, doesn't it, that had he thought that he</p> <p>6 was at any particularly significant risk working at</p> <p>7 In Amenas he would either have left or not returned?</p> <p>8 A. Yes, I fully agree with that. He was -- he did weigh up</p> <p>9 the risks and I think he believed, wrongly, as it turns</p> <p>10 out, that he would be protected by both BP and the</p> <p>11 Algerian army.</p> <p>12 MS GOLLOP: Thank you very much.</p> <p>13 Further questions from MR OWEN-THOMAS</p> <p>14 MR OWEN-THOMAS: Mr Green, it appears no one else has any</p> <p>15 questions. I hope, sir, if you don't mind that if</p> <p>16 I just ask if Mr Green has covered everything or there</p> <p>17 is anything he wishes to add.</p> <p>18 A. Yes, I would just like to add something about what Nick</p> <p>19 Hitch told me. Belinda was present and also Nicholas,</p> <p>20 that he spoke to us on February 20, 2013. He described</p> <p>21 the events in the car. I believe that's covered in his</p> <p>22 witness statement but he did say something about the</p> <p>23 attitude of the Algerians and he said to us that it felt</p> <p>24 like a zoo with the Algerians milling round the foreign</p> <p>25 hostages and he referred specifically to one Algerian</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 12</p>

3 (Pages 9 to 12)

<p>1 who was -- seemed to be very, I wouldn't say close but 2 he was laughing and joking with the terrorists bringing 3 them food and drink. Now, I don't know whether that was 4 just to keep them sweet but Nick Hitch's remark was 5 "I'll deal with that person when I get back." So he 6 felt that some of the Algerians were too close to the 7 terrorists. That's the impression I got. 8 MR OWEN-THOMAS: Thank you, Mr Green. 9 THE CORONER: Thank you very much indeed, thank you. 10 A. Thank you. 11 (The witness withdrew) 12 MS DOLAN: Sir, that is the only live witness today. There 13 are some statements to be made and Mr Charnock is going 14 to read a statement from Mrs John. 15 Statement of MRS NICOLA JOHN (read) 16 MR CHARNOCK: Sir, this is the statement of Nicola John. It 17 says: 18 "I make this further statement to set out my 19 evidence in relation to contemporaneous events 20 culminating in the attack at In Amenas. It was part of 21 Sebastian's contractual terms that he would be available 22 to travel and work in any other country in which BP had 23 a business interest. Exhibited to this statement as 24 exhibit NJ2 is a copy of Seb's contract of employment 25 with BP containing the clause as to location of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 13</p>	<p>1 Employees should review the security website prior to 2 assignment departure. The site contains comprehensive 3 security advice and policies related to travel and other 4 protocols in addition to information about countries and 5 regions also external links to information subscription 6 services, control risk and government sources, FCO, 7 state et cetera are available to assist orientating 8 travellers for posting staff at international 9 locations.' 10 "As far as I am aware Algeria was not characterised 11 as a high risk destination and so there was no security 12 briefing by the VP for the SPU or Seb's line manager. 13 I am aware that Seb received a security briefing when he 14 arrived in Algeria but this seemed focused on health and 15 safety issues. Before Seb left for Algeria he was aware 16 of the drivers strike and I believe he may have got his 17 information from the BP security website. I do not 18 believe there was any other information contained on the 19 BP security website about Algeria that gave Seb cause 20 for concern. 21 "Whilst Seb was waiting to go on rotation he felt 22 a bit lost at BP as he did not have a direct manager in 23 the country and felt like he did not have much work to 24 do. He really disliked this situation as he loved to 25 work hard and to be a respected member of the team.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 15</p>
<p>1 employment. Seb was informed that he would be working 2 in Algeria by email. Exhibited to this statement as 3 exhibit NJ3 is a copy of the email from Andrew McEwan 4 dated 30 July 2012 in which Seb was informed that he 5 would be joining the north Africa team. He did not have 6 to say in where he was deployed or whether he was being 7 sent abroad. There was not any process that I am aware 8 of or which involved Seb and I through which BP took 9 account of any personal situation like the fact that he 10 had a young son. 11 Amongst the documentation Seb received with his 12 contract was an information leaflet entitled 'UK 13 employee on international rotator assignment', a copy of 14 this document is exhibited to my statement as exhibit 15 NJ4. 16 "This included a section on security which reads: 17 'A security briefing is mandatory for any employee 18 travelling to high risk destinations. Please refer to 19 the BP group security website for clarification. If you 20 are travelling to a high risk destination please contact 21 the VP of security for your SPU or your line manager to 22 determine the security briefing requirements and to make 23 the necessary arrangements. Countries that are not 24 considered high risk will typically offer some form of 25 security orientation by local staff upon arrival.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 14</p>	<p>1 Therefore, he looked forward to the deployment to 2 Algeria as allowing him to properly get stuck into his 3 new career. In terms of timescales for his departure 4 this was dependent on Seb obtaining his visa for 5 Algeria. He made the application in September 2012. 6 This took several months to process and his visa was 7 successfully obtained in December 2012 just before 8 Christmas. 9 "Naturally the fact that he was going to Algeria 10 provoked discussion between us. The initial arrangement 11 was that he would go out to Algeria for a four week 12 period, then rotate back for four weeks. However, this 13 then changed to a three week period. He was concerned 14 about leaving our son and I on our own for a three week 15 period. 16 "Having said that, we discussed that this afforded 17 him the opportunity to throw himself into his work and 18 allow him to focus on the task. Whereas whilst he 19 worked at Arup he would quite often arrive home very 20 late. He obviously now had to consider his child. He 21 was also aware that working in Algeria would offer more 22 in terms of money which would benefit us as a young 23 family. In terms of Algeria itself he did not have any 24 specific concerns. 25 "As far as I was aware and from what Seb told me</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 16</p>

4 (Pages 13 to 16)

1 there was not any specific training that he had to
 2 undertake in relation to working in Algeria other than
 3 completing a short question and answer document
 4 intercultural pre-programme questionnaire which was sent
 5 out by email exhibited to this statement as exhibit NH5
 6 is a copy of the questionnaire completed by Seb.
 7 "I do not believe there was any follow up to his
 8 completion of this questionnaire. In his questionnaire
 9 when asked about the negatives of the assignment from
 10 his perspective Seb mentioned that it would be difficult
 11 for him to be away from his family and also that the
 12 security issue worried him a little bit. Although he was
 13 confident that BP would take good care of everything.
 14 The only security issue which I think Seb
 15 had on his mind was the drivers strike. However neither
 16 Seb or I were able to think through what the
 17 implications of the drivers strike may be or how serious
 18 it was. Everyone who mentioned it seemed quite blasé
 19 about it. Otherwise in terms of security I think Seb
 20 had a general concern about being in the middle of
 21 nowhere but nothing specific or related to the threat of
 22 terrorism.
 23 "We were both aware that it was a vast country and
 24 that where he was going to be working when he was
 25 informed was in a relative proximity to Libya. However,

Page 17

1 Seb had no previous experience of being in Algeria or
 2 any other country in north Africa for that matter.
 3 Concerns were about being away from his family. Algeria
 4 was in essence the place where he would simply be
 5 working. I also remember him discussing concerns about
 6 extremes in temperatures but none of my conversations
 7 with Seb led me to believe that he had any specific
 8 concerns that the deployment to Algeria could be
 9 dangerous.
 10 "Once the visa had been successfully processed Seb was
 11 made aware that he would be leaving for Algeria from
 12 Gatwick Airport on Wednesday, January 9, 2013. Prior to
 13 flying to Algiers he travelled down to Gatwick Airport
 14 on Tuesday, January 8, 2013 where he stayed in the
 15 Hilton Hotel. Just prior to Christmas Seb had been
 16 informed that he was specifically going to be working at
 17 the In Amenas gas field in southern Algeria which was an
 18 extremely long way from the capital, Algiers. Seb
 19 himself had no previous experience of In Amenas.
 20 However, his uncle David Baker has worked extensively at
 21 In Amenas over the last few years and Seb contacted him
 22 several times by email. Doing this enabled Seb to learn
 23 about the day-to-day routine, for example when lunchtimes
 24 were, which would be between 11 am to 1 pm and
 25 the working day which was from 6 am to 6 pm.

Page 18

1 "As Seb left he was very upset about leaving us but
 2 was keen to get started with his work to get it over
 3 with. Although he was excited at the prospect of
 4 beginning his career with BP and the opportunity he
 5 thought this placement would provide him the reality of
 6 being separated from me and his baby son was hitting
 7 hard in the weeks before he left when he would often
 8 break down in tears about the prospect of going.
 9 "By that stage I believe that if he had been able to
 10 identify an objective reason or felt he had a choice not
 11 to go to Algeria he would not have gone. I really
 12 didn't want him to go either but I tried not to show it
 13 too much as I did not want to make it harder for him.
 14 "After he arrived in Algiers he flew down to
 15 In Amenas. Although the physical environment was very
 16 different and he was in the desert this did not pose any
 17 problems. Seb told me the temperature was about
 18 25 degrees Celsius though much colder in the evenings.
 19 He himself was very fit and healthy and had no health
 20 issues. Nor did he have any particular allergies which
 21 would have caused him concern. As Seb settled at
 22 In Amenas we formed a routine of daily contact. He
 23 would usually send me an email from his work email
 24 account. This would be sent to my personal email
 25 account. He would send me an email usually early in the

Page 19

1 morning which I would see when I woke up. He would tend
 2 to send emails on a periodic basis throughout the day to
 3 which I would respond to normally. In addition, I would
 4 sometimes send him pictures which would be from my
 5 Google mail account.
 6 "Seb told me the work was going okay. He was
 7 involved in a project building a restaurant on site
 8 which he enjoyed. He told me he had some concerns
 9 regarding health and safety issues. This was generally
 10 with regard to comparing the standards he was used to in
 11 the UK and what he was experiencing in Algeria working
 12 with different teams from separate countries. He said
 13 to me in an email that the health and safety was very
 14 poor which he felt was due to the contractor being
 15 Turkish and the Algerian workforce not seeming to
 16 understand a lot of the procedures. Although he was
 17 getting on with being over there, he confided to me that
 18 he did not really like it and wanted to come home. We
 19 were counting down the days until he came back.
 20 Though he did not raise any particular concerns he
 21 was concerned about the prospect of the Algerian drivers
 22 going on strike again which he told me about
 23 on January 13, 2013. He thought this may impact on the
 24 safety of himself and the other workers if this
 25 happened. I thought at this time to myself that I hoped

Page 20

1 this meant he would be coming home soon as I thought if
 2 there were any concerns at all that BP would get him out
 3 of there.
 4 "Seb would speak to me by telephone when he
 5 telephoned me on my mobile number. He would call me
 6 during his lunch break and then around 5.30 to 6 in the
 7 evening and then later around 7 pm which would be UK
 8 time. Although he had his mobile with him, an HTC IS,
 9 he would normally call from his phone in the room, an
 10 Algerian landline which showed on my phone as a private
 11 number. I did not know this number. I believe he may
 12 have called at some point from his mobile. However,
 13 mostly it was from the room phone to my mobile or
 14 sometimes my landline.
 15 "Seb was a very easy going person who had a likeable
 16 personality and would happily get on with people. I do
 17 not recall any specific names. However, he told me he
 18 was socialising and making friends with his colleagues.
 19 For example, he had told me that he on occasion played
 20 football with them.
 21 "On Tuesday, January 15, 2013 I received an email
 22 from Seb's personal account which was timed at 15.49.
 23 He stated 'someone has damaged the fibre-optic cable
 24 from the site so the internet is very intermittent.'
 25 This is why he used his personal account as he could not
 Page 21

1 access the work account but other than that everything
 2 seemed okay.
 3 "At 09.09 hours on Wednesday, January 16, 2013
 4 I received a call on my mobile from Seb's mobile. As I
 5 answered Seb spoke. It sounded as if he were trying to
 6 be calm but underneath I could tell he was frightened.
 7 He asked if I was sitting down. At the time
 8 I was at home upstairs in my bedroom. I realised
 9 something was up. I initially thought at this stage he
 10 was going to say something about the drivers strike.
 11 Seb said that he had been taken hostage by Al Qaeda.
 12 And he told me that I had to call the British embassy in
 13 order to get the helicopters of the Algerian army to
 14 move back otherwise, as I recall, he said they would
 15 either kill the hostages or blow the plant up.
 16 "I scrambled to get a pen to write this down as best
 17 I could. I remember asking him several times for
 18 clarification to which he responded and repeated the
 19 message, also stating to get the army back. I remember
 20 he said he was still at In Amenas. I asked him if he
 21 was okay and he said something like he was okay but
 22 reiterated he had been taken hostage.
 23 "I meant this to be that he was okay physically.
 24 I did not know what was happening to him. I would say
 25 that ordinarily in stressful situations Seb is calm and
 Page 22

1 level headed even though he might not be feeling it on
 2 the inside. I told Seb that I loved him and he told me
 3 that he did too. I said that I would do as he had asked
 4 and I believe he hung up. I did hear other people in
 5 the background just talking, not shouting though.
 6 I could not say what the language these were in. In
 7 total the call lasted for 2-minutes and 8 seconds. This
 8 was the last time I spoke to Seb. I was shocked. Then
 9 I started to panic. I did an internet search for the
 10 British embassy, not in Algiers, just British embassy.
 11 I called a number, spoke to someone telling them what
 12 had happened and they put me through to a man who said
 13 he was called John Slater. I do not recall what he did
 14 or where he was from but he said that they were aware of
 15 several calls that had come in and knew about the
 16 incident.
 17 "I received a text on my mobile from Seb's mobile at
 18 0.918 hours that day that said "I love you so much babe,
 19 never forget that, kiss kiss" I instantly replied that
 20 I loved him and five minutes later I texted him to say
 21 "I called the embassy. They said they're looking into
 22 it and will call me back. Please keep in touch, kiss
 23 kiss."
 24 At 09.26 the same day he replied "Talk to my mum
 25 please and look after our tiny man. You're the most
 Page 23

1 amazing wife ever, kiss kiss."
 2 I responded to him and told him that I was calling
 3 his mother. I sent several more texts to Seb that
 4 morning but received no reply and no more text messages
 5 from him. I did however later that morning receive two
 6 emails from Seb's other personal account. Neither email
 7 had any words. One just had a picture attachment each.
 8 The pictures were of men in military fatigues in
 9 a courtyard. In one of the pictures I could see
 10 people's legs visibly in the picture as if they were
 11 sitting down on the ground. One of the men in military
 12 fatigues had a gun. I do not want ever to see these
 13 pictures again. My mobile phone is an HTC IS and was
 14 given to the police a week later at the Sofitel at Gatwick
 15 Airport on Thursday, January 24, 2013. This
 16 phone was downloaded by the police and I produce this as
 17 an exhibit NJ1.
 18 "In respect of the emails I allowed DC Simon Collins
 19 to access my email account in order that he could
 20 forward the emails I received from Seb with the pictures
 21 to his Metropolitan Police account. This was down at
 22 19.55-hours on Thursday, January, 24, 2013 as the police
 23 informed me that they were having problems downloading
 24 the emails. The emails from Seb were shown as being
 25 sent at 10.38 and 9 seconds and 10.38 and 12 seconds
 Page 24

<p>1 respectively on the morning of Wednesday, January 16, 2 2013. There was no further contact made to me by Seb at 3 any point. I was visited by numerous police officers 4 over the days that followed. I made many attempts to 5 contact BP on Wednesday, 16 January 2013 to try and get 6 some more information from them but struggled to get 7 someone who would talk to me. 8 "Eventually, probably the following day, I did end 9 up being assigned to a point of contact with them. This 10 contact then changed. They were not able to give me any 11 more information about what was going on." 12 MR CHARNOCK: Sir, there is a supplementary statement given 13 by Nicola John, which reads: 14 Supplementary statement of MRS NICOLA JOHN (read) 15 "I make this supplementary statement to my factual 16 statement signed and dated 9 September 2014. I have 17 recently remembered a text message Seb sent me on 18 25 September 2012 which I kept on an old phone of mine. 19 I am able to produce the phone displaying the message if 20 required but I do not have a paper copy at present. The 21 text message which was received when Seb had started 22 work for BP in the Sunbury office before he was deployed 23 to Algeria reads: 24 'got in this morning and met one of the office 25 managers. He has worried me as he said they have had</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 25</p>	<p>1 BP's senior vice president for global projects and 2 subsequently to celebrate his father's 70th anniversary 3 in the USA. Carlos had worked exceptionally hard 4 preparing for the meeting in Egypt as he was very keen 5 to make a good impression on Mr Shaw. However, 6 following the comments made at the meeting 7 in December 2012 Carlos felt he should arrange for 8 somebody else to attend the meeting in Egypt in his 9 place and he should personally travel to the gas plant. 10 Carlos therefore made arrangements to fly out to Algeria 11 on 14 January 2013. At this stage Carlos did not tell 12 me that he had been given any security warnings 13 regarding Algeria and for this reason I assumed that the 14 drivers strike must have ended. Carlos left home to 15 travel to Algeria Sunday, 13 January 2013. He spent the 16 night at Gatwick before boarding a 6 am flight to 17 Algeria the next morning. It seemed that there were 18 issues with the project so executives from Japan and 19 Norway were also going to travel to Algeria for the 20 meeting. 21 "At 6.22 am on Monday, 14 January 2013 I received 22 a text message from Carlos's mobile telephone number ... 23 to my mobile telephone ... 24 "All of our communications whilst Carlos was in 25 Algeria were between these two mobile telephones except</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 27</p>
<p>1 trouble getting civil's guys the work permits to go to 2 Algeria. He says he's surprised they're even trying to 3 put me out there.' 4 "We spoke on the phone shortly afterwards although 5 I cannot remember what was discussed." 6 MR CHARNOCK: Sir, that concludes her statement. 7 THE CORONER: Thank you. 8 MS DOLAN: Sir, the next statement to be read is from 9 Mrs Gaviria. 10 MR CHARNOCK: Sir, it is the statement of Claudia Gaviria 11 and is dated 5 November 2013. 12 Statement of CLAUDIA GAVIRIA (read) 13 "In around December 2012 I recall Carlos telling me 14 that he had been in a meeting at work with the regional 15 president for BP in north Africa, Mr Felipe Posada, and 16 asked him why he had not yet travelled to the In Amenas 17 gas plant in Algeria. Carlos told me that also present 18 at the meeting was Andrew Collins. Carlos was 19 a perfectionist and always made a great effort for BP 20 and so he was very upset by the implication that he had 21 simply chosen not to travel to Algeria. He 22 therefore felt obliged to travel to the gas plant as 23 soon as possible. 24 "Carlos's plans for January 2013 were originally to 25 attend an important meeting in Egypt with Neil Shaw,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 26</p>	<p>1 for the last voice mail he left. On this occasion he 2 called the landline. I don't know what number he was 3 using when he left this message. The text I received at 4 6.22 read: 5 'I am on the plane just about to leave or depart. 6 I love you.' 7 "On Carlos's arrival in Algeria he changed planes and 8 whilst he was waiting for the next plane he called me 9 and said it was horrible. The plane was delayed and 10 everyone was smoking. At around the same time as 11 I received this call from Carlos sent me a text message. 12 The time of receipt of the message was 10.21 am. It 13 read: 14 'I have arrived at Hassi Messaoud well. I have 15 another plane to In Amenas in one hour or so.' 16 "Carlos later sent me a text message and called me 17 from the bus in In Amenas. In the telephone call he 18 described the road and said the bus had a military 19 convoy. Carlos said he had not realised that the bus 20 would have a military convoy and he was very surprised 21 by this. I said I hoped nothing would happen but at 22 that time I wasn't afraid. The time of the text shows 23 as 2.32 pm. It read: 24 'I have arrived at In Amenas well. Now I have one 25 and a quarter hours on a bus with a military convoy to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 28</p>

<p>1 get to the operations base.'</p> <p>2 "I have subsequently found out from the Statoil</p> <p>3 report and from investigation into the attack dated</p> <p>4 12 September 2013, page 38, that in a public statement</p> <p>5 in December 2012 Mokhtar Belmokhtar announced that he</p> <p>6 was leaving AQIM and had established a new organisation</p> <p>7 known as the al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam, Those Who Sign with</p> <p>8 Blood Brigade, at which stage he announced his intention</p> <p>9 to strike western interests.</p> <p>10 "Carlos and I would also discuss most things and he</p> <p>11 never told me of any warnings or notifications he had</p> <p>12 been given about security concerns in Algeria or of any</p> <p>13 risk assessments which he was aware of or which had</p> <p>14 revealed any risks. For these reasons I am certain that</p> <p>15 Carlos did not know about any security risks posed to</p> <p>16 him in his deployment to Algeria including the above</p> <p>17 threat from Mokhtar Belmokhtar.</p> <p>18 "I strongly believe that had Carlos known of the</p> <p>19 risks posed he would have elected not to have travelled</p> <p>20 to Algeria and would instead have travelled to his</p> <p>21 meeting in Egypt as was originally planned.</p> <p>22 "On Tuesday, 15 January 2013 I received another</p> <p>23 telephone call from Carlos but I don't remember talking</p> <p>24 about his work in Algeria or about the site.</p> <p>25 "At about 9.45 am on Wednesday, 16 January 2013</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 29</p>	<p>1 had been in contact with him and the emergency group and</p> <p>2 they would keep me updated.</p> <p>3 "At about 9 pm I noticed that Carlos had left</p> <p>4 a voice mail on the landline. The message appeared to</p> <p>5 have been left at 2.39 pm. In the message Carlos left</p> <p>6 greetings for his daughters and me. He did not say</p> <p>7 anything about the situation in Algeria. I think he was</p> <p>8 crying.</p> <p>9 "I later gave the answer phone to the police so they</p> <p>10 could make a recording of the message. Late on the</p> <p>11 night of Wednesday, 16 January, 2013 DC Craig and DC Sue</p> <p>12 Cousins came to the flat. They introduced themselves</p> <p>13 and explained that the situation in Algeria was very</p> <p>14 uncertain but that they would be in regular contact with</p> <p>15 any new information as soon as it was possible.</p> <p>16 "On Thursday, 24 January 2013 DC Craig and DC Martin</p> <p>17 Ferguson came to see me and told me that Carlos had been</p> <p>18 identified as a victim. He had been killed. He was to</p> <p>19 be flown into Gatwick the next day."</p> <p>20 MR CHARNOCK: Sir, that concludes the statement.</p> <p>21 MS DOLAN: Sir, the next statement is of Mr Nicholas Hitch.</p> <p>22 Statement of MR NICHOLAS HITCH (read) MR</p> <p>23 CHARNOCK: Sir, this is the statement of Nicholas</p> <p>24 Manville Hitch and is dated 16 April 2013. It reads as</p> <p>25 follows:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 31</p>
<p>1 I noticed I had four unread text messages on my mobile</p> <p>2 phone, all from Carlos. The first three appeared to</p> <p>3 have been sent at 5.44 am and they were in Spanish. The</p> <p>4 first read:</p> <p>5 'Love, there was an attack on the camp with lots of</p> <p>6 shooting. I'm okay. It's finished. The army was</p> <p>7 mobilised. Don't say anything to the girls. I will</p> <p>8 write a text every 15 minutes. I am okay. I love you.'</p> <p>9 The second text read:</p> <p>10 'Felipe already knows and the contingency plan is</p> <p>11 being implemented.'</p> <p>12 Felipe is Felipe Posada.</p> <p>13 The third text read:</p> <p>14 'I'm okay, continue the day normally and don't say</p> <p>15 anything to Isabelita so that she's relaxed for the</p> <p>16 exam.'</p> <p>17 Isabella is our eldest daughter.</p> <p>18 The fourth text appears to have been sent at</p> <p>19 06.02-hours and it read:</p> <p>20 'I'm okay, my darling the worst is over and the</p> <p>21 situation is returning to normality.'</p> <p>22 "When I had read these text messages I rang Carlos</p> <p>23 but got no answer. I sent text messages but got no</p> <p>24 reply. I then rang Felipe Posada and he told me that</p> <p>25 there had been an attack on the camp. He said Carlos</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 30</p>	<p>1 "I made this statement willingly at my home address</p> <p>2 on 4 February 2013. By training I am a civil engineer</p> <p>3 and have worked in the oil and gas industry for</p> <p>4 35 years. I am currently a BP staff employee and have</p> <p>5 worked for the company for 25 years. Ten years in UK</p> <p>6 projects and the last 15 in international projects.</p> <p>7 I am the project manager of the In Amenas Compression</p> <p>8 Project IACP and have been leading the project for the</p> <p>9 last 14 years.</p> <p>10 "Since the summer of 2012 I have been on a rotation</p> <p>11 of three weeks working and three weeks leave so have</p> <p>12 been there regularly for the last six months. Timings</p> <p>13 noted while I was in Algeria are local, one hour ahead</p> <p>14 of UK time.</p> <p>15 "I will mention a number of people in my statement</p> <p>16 who I will introduce now. Identifiable terrorists.</p> <p>17 Terrorist 1, he got us out of the VIP room 4, he wore</p> <p>18 green and brown battle fatigues, possibly north African.</p> <p>19 Egyptian, Libyan or Algerian, he spoke in Arabic, very</p> <p>20 aggressive, black curly hair under a head dress and of</p> <p>21 a light build.</p> <p>22 "Terrorist 2, who got us out of VIP room 4, wore</p> <p>23 battle fatigues, possibly north African. Egyptian,</p> <p>24 Libyan or Algerian and he spoke Arabic.</p> <p>25 "Terrorist 3. North American, spoke very good</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 32</p>

<p>1 English. Some described him as being Canadian. He was 2 lightly built, 5-foot 9 inches tall, light hair and 3 a small goatee beard and glasses. 4 "Terrorist 4. He was quite old. Short and fat and 5 possibly the leader of the group. He was in possession 6 of the rocket launcher. 7 "For on site security we were fully reliant on the 8 Gendarmes. I believe there may have been about 150 of 9 them. The Gendarmes were all Algerians, not formal army 10 but armed police. They were the only persons allowed to 11 carry firearms. The Algerian military insisted that 12 expats could not be armed. The Algerian Gendarmes were 13 responsible directly to the military command in Algeria 14 and the senior officer for that group works with the JV 15 through an OLS, Yann Desyeux, and an OLC, Paul Morgan, 16 who both worked on the site. Any requirements by the 17 military as to what we can and cannot do are conveyed to 18 us by the liaison officers and any needs we have for 19 escorts in the area or concerns are related to the army 20 through them. The site is generally very well lit in 21 the hours of darkness though with a lot of standard 22 lights on high poles so you could generally walk around 23 the camp area in good light. However, the road between 24 the camp and the CPF is not lit as you are not supposed 25 to be out there when it is dark. I am unaware of any</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 33</p>	<p>1 provide people with safe accommodation. 2 "There was nothing around the 16 January 2013 to 3 make anybody feel unsafe on the site but there had been 4 a heightened awareness as we had always felt that the 5 destabilisation of Libya meant that anyone could move 6 freely through Libya and then cross the border, plus the 7 situation in Mali had the potential to spill over into 8 Algeria. 9 "We had been having daily discussions with the OLC 10 about the incident in Mali, together with the Algerian 11 army having troop movements, bringing more material down 12 to the area. These discussions took place back in BP 13 head office as well as on site. 14 "We had a fleet of vehicles on site to transport us 15 from the BdV and the CPF. The standard vehicle was 16 a Toyota Landcruiser. My project had a fleet of ten 17 Nissan patrol vehicles, 4 by 4, with a roll-over cage. In 18 general you are allowed to circle freely within the field 19 between certain checkpoints and sites from about 20 05.30 hours and 19.00-hours. A curfew was in place 21 outside these times so basically you are allowed to 22 drive in hours of daylight but the basis of this policy 23 is that the area is patrolled regularly by the Gendarmes 24 and should be secure. If you go outside that area to 25 a well site then an escort is required. Similarly, an</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 35</p>
<p>1 CCTV in the camp. There may be cameras in some areas 2 but not generally. 3 "There are a couple of screens in the Post de Guard 4 which is at the entrance of the BdV but I don't think 5 that they generally have CCTV. Sites are generally 6 protected by a chain link fence. Working areas by 7 a single chain link fence and the expat accommodation 8 areas by a double fence. This is a wire fence about 2 9 to 3 metres high with razor wire on top. The fencing 10 was not electrified. There are also concrete crash 11 blocks outside the accommodation and vehicle access 12 point, chicanes, crash blocks to prevent vehicles 13 crashing through. 14 "I felt safe on the site as we hadn't had an 15 incident in my memory. As leader of the project I would 16 have regular discussions with the liaison officers about 17 incidents happening anywhere else in Algeria. They also 18 regularly briefed us on these issues and the situation 19 in Mali. 20 "We do try to maintain vigilance so that we are in 21 a position to react to any incidents. Over the last six 22 months of 2012 we had a strike situation on site which 23 compromised the ability to move people. We responded to 24 that by demobilising expats from the site so we were 25 able to respond quickly if we think we are unable to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 34</p>	<p>1 escort is required to go to the airport. 2 "VCP1 is where you join the main road out to 3 In Amenas and VCP2 is down on the other side of well 4 sites. 5 "The main entrance to the BdV is by the 6 Post de Guard where the OLS would reside. The OLC would 7 reside in the office area over in the CC. Behind the 8 Post de Guard is a reception building or foyer. This is 9 the area where during the siege the Algerian staff were 10 held and retained by the terrorists. To the left is the 11 restaurant where I believe there was a considerable 12 shoot out with the terrorists. They took a lot of 13 hostages from this location, a couple being badly 14 injured. Between the foyer and the restaurant is 15 a round social area, a brick built area with a seat in 16 the inside where people could sit and talk. People may 17 also refer to this as the plaza area. There is also 18 a similar place between the VIP accommodation block and 19 the clinic and those two areas are the primary areas 20 where we were kept by the terrorists as well as outside 21 the VIP block. 22 "The VIP accommodation block had six bedrooms in it 23 at the time. Room 1 was Mark Cobb. Room 2 was 24 Tore Bech. Room 3 was Lotfi Benadouda. Room 4 was 25 Carlos Estrada. Room 5, myself and room 6 Victor</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 36</p>

<p>1 Sneberg.</p> <p>2 "It became apparent during the attack that the VIPs</p> <p>3 were particularly targeted and we were kept near the VIP</p> <p>4 building at all times. The other villas were allocated</p> <p>5 to staff dependent on their seniority. The more senior</p> <p>6 staff the bigger villas. The senior villas housed 8</p> <p>7 with 8 rooms and were generally used by the expats and</p> <p>8 Sonatrach employees from the operations team. More</p> <p>9 ordinary operations technicians would stay in the junior</p> <p>10 villas which were basically just a little smaller, each block</p> <p>11 housing about 16 rooms. Each block was described with</p> <p>12 a letter, other than the VIP block which was just called</p> <p>13 'VIP block'.</p> <p>14 "On 16 January most of the rooms would be full with</p> <p>15 the floating population living in the contractors' camp</p> <p>16 CC. Typically you would have 70 expats on site but</p> <p>17 hundreds of people would be on the camp at any one time</p> <p>18 dependent on what work was being done. The day shift</p> <p>19 works between 6 am and 6 pm but the plant also operates</p> <p>20 a night shift. Staff on the night shift who have been</p> <p>21 mobilised to the CPF do not go off until the end of</p> <p>22 curfew unless they have a special reason to do so and</p> <p>23 this would be with an escort. We have offices at the</p> <p>24 BdV for management to work in should they need to work</p> <p>25 past 6 pm. Between 0.430 and 06.00-hours most people</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 37</p>	<p>1 Statoil, Victor Sneberg, country manager. Reda Rezzoug, In</p> <p>2 Amenas asset manager and Malek Ait-Younes, operations</p> <p>3 engineer. Sonatrach was Attik Slimane, operations</p> <p>4 engineer and Miss Amara Hakima, HSE engineer. JGC,</p> <p>5 Mr Aratani, senior VP. Mr Ito, Algeria projects</p> <p>6 director and Mr Maekawa, a senior construction manager.</p> <p>7 "On 16 January 2013 I was going to breakfast at</p> <p>8 05.45 hours. The previous evening I had made</p> <p>9 arrangements with my line manager, Carlos Estrada, who</p> <p>10 was in the next room that he would knock on my door at</p> <p>11 5.45 and we would go to breakfast together. I would</p> <p>12 typically allow myself an hour to get up and ready.</p> <p>13 This also gives me time to check emails before I went</p> <p>14 out so I had been awake since about 4.45.</p> <p>15 "Mark Cobb had knocked on my door about 5.15. We</p> <p>16 had a brief discussion about arrangements for a formal</p> <p>17 dinner that was arranged for the senior party later that</p> <p>18 evening. This was the last time I saw him during the</p> <p>19 incident. Mark Cobb advised during a call next day that</p> <p>20 he had reached the offices at BdV before the terrorists</p> <p>21 attacked. Carlos Estrada knocked on my door at</p> <p>22 05.45 hours and just as he did this one of the BdV</p> <p>23 warning sirens went off. There are two sirens at the</p> <p>24 site. An alternating sound indicates fire and</p> <p>25 a continuous sound indicates a security issue. We heard</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 39</p>
<p>1 would be waking and going to breakfast.</p> <p>2 "In my role as Compression Project manager I was one</p> <p>3 of seven team leaders and had seven staff members who</p> <p>4 reported to me on the site at the time. The remainder</p> <p>5 of my team were in Manilla or on leave cycle. The team</p> <p>6 leader who was largely responsible for the operations at</p> <p>7 the CPF would have been Tore Bech of Statoil.</p> <p>8 "Arrangements for a senior management visit had been</p> <p>9 made about a month before the terrorist attack. There</p> <p>10 was a lot of planning required to deal with the</p> <p>11 logistics for people to come to the meeting. Infield</p> <p>12 flights, desert passes and accommodation at site all</p> <p>13 required arranging so it would have been common</p> <p>14 knowledge that there were to be important visitors over</p> <p>15 this period. The senior party had mostly arrived by</p> <p>16 Monday, 14 January 2013 in the evening. A full day of</p> <p>17 meetings and site inspections had taken place on</p> <p>18 Tuesday, 15 January and were due to meet again on</p> <p>19 Wednesday at 7 am. We were due to convene at the</p> <p>20 temporary lay down area, which was shown on map NAS 1,</p> <p>21 page 2, a short drive away from the camp. The senior</p> <p>22 management visitors were due to leave the site on the</p> <p>23 Thursday. Attendees to this meeting not normally</p> <p>24 resident at the site are noted below as follows:</p> <p>25 "BP, Carlos Estrada, vice president OBO Gas.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 38</p>	<p>1 the alternating siren I think which suggests there was</p> <p>2 a fire not a security incident. I think it was the</p> <p>3 wrong alarm. We assumed it was a fire drill, albeit all</p> <p>4 previous drills were normally at night. So I gathered</p> <p>5 my things on the assumption we were going to have to go</p> <p>6 to the muster point for a drill. As Carlos and</p> <p>7 I stepped out of the VIP building facing the plaza area</p> <p>8 there was a lot of gunfire and tracer coming across our</p> <p>9 heads and hitting the wall. So straightaway we knew it</p> <p>10 was clearly not a drill. We fled back inside the</p> <p>11 building. Our instructions in a case involving this</p> <p>12 sort of attack would be to go to our rooms, lock the</p> <p>13 doors and turn the lights out, close the curtains, get</p> <p>14 down low and stay quiet. So we went back to room 4,</p> <p>15 Carlos Estrada's room. Victor Sneberg, the Statoil</p> <p>16 country manager in room 6, had at the same time come out</p> <p>17 of his room. He told us that a bullet that had been</p> <p>18 fired at the building had gone through the wall into his</p> <p>19 room. He joined us in room 4 so all three of us were</p> <p>20 together. By 6 o'clock all three of us were cowering on</p> <p>21 the floor in the darkness.</p> <p>22 "Shortly after that at least two terrorists came</p> <p>23 into the VIP block but not to our room, shouting 'get</p> <p>24 out, come on' in a very aggressive manner. They both</p> <p>25 had north African accents but shouted their commands in</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 40</p>

1 English. I could hear them kicking in doors and firing
 2 their weapons which was terrifying and we thought they
 3 would burst into the room immediately but they didn't.
 4 They just shouted at the door for a minute or two and
 5 then they left the building. I could hear gunfire and
 6 shouting further afield in the camp and we all made
 7 phone calls and began sending text messages to get
 8 information out. I cannot recall exactly who I spoke to
 9 as my memory is sketchy but between us all I remember us
 10 getting hold of Geoff Yates, Andy Collins, Kieran Dolan
 11 and Mark Cobb. I had trouble sending texts on my
 12 international phone which is an iPhone 4. I lost this
 13 phone during the incident. I also had a local phone
 14 which is a Nokia which was the main phone I used during
 15 the incident. Connectivity on the iPhone was hit and miss
 16 but I continued to try using it.

17 "When we were able to speak to people we told them
 18 we had been attacked and it was a terrorist attack. We
 19 got no information back from them as no one outside the
 20 camp knew anything at that point. They tried to be
 21 reassuring but I think they were aware this was
 22 a serious incident now. As the time passed we became
 23 hopeful that the Gendarmes may have recovered the
 24 situation. However, about an hour and a half later the
 25 two terrorists, 1 and 2, came back to the VIP building

Page 41

1 and burst into the room we were in. They were shouting
 2 threatening and pointing their weapons at us. I thought
 3 we would be shot at this point but they just grabbed us
 4 by our clothing and dragged and pushed us out into the
 5 plaza area. They sat us down on the outside of the
 6 circular meeting area on the ground. We were some of
 7 the first half dozen to arrive there but the number
 8 gradually grew during the day as more people were
 9 brought over by the terrorists. They sat us down in
 10 a line around the circular area and secured us with
 11 cable ties around our wrists and feet. Not everyone had
 12 ties on their feet. I didn't. I only had ties on my
 13 wrists which were not that secure as I was able to get
 14 my hands out. Some people had handcuffs on. Carlos had
 15 cable ties placed around his wrists and feet.

16 "When we asked to make calls to family, seniors
 17 et cetera my phone didn't work so I borrowed a phone
 18 from Sebastian John to call my wife, Shelley Hitch, in
 19 York and my mother, Shirley Hitch, in Devon. I recall
 20 there being quite a lot of people in the canteen and
 21 a lot of noise coming from there mainly shouting perhaps
 22 gunfire but I can't remember. The terrorists then
 23 pushed a crowd of people out, possibly ten or more.
 24 They all came over and sat with us in the centre of the
 25 plaza. One of them was Victor Lovelady, an American.

Page 42

1 Victor Lovelady had cable ties put around his wrist only
 2 as he had a broken ankle and wasn't mobile. Victor had
 3 broken his ankle after he fell attempting to climb into
 4 the suspended ceiling to hide. I later found out that
 5 others had successfully climbed up and hid there for the
 6 duration of the incident. Victor was in a lot of pain
 7 so we looked after him and iced his ankle. Yann Desyeux
 8 was a medic and asked the north American, terrorist 3,
 9 if he could provide first aid and they willingly allowed
 10 him to do this. They also allowed him to get his
 11 supplies from the clinic and ice for Victor. Others
 12 I recall being brought out to join us in the plaza were
 13 Iain Adamson, Stephen McFaul, Sebastian John and Kenneth
 14 Whiteside. Later in the afternoon I remember an
 15 American, Fred Buttaccio, was found and he also joined
 16 us too. All of these men had their hands and/or feet
 17 tied but I can't recall exactly the situation for each.

18 "Once the canteen had been emptied there were
 19 perhaps 20 of us sat together. I did not count at that
 20 point. I did count later. I heard that there was
 21 a Norwegian, Kjell Jan Kversov, in the canteen who had
 22 two gunshot wounds. I never saw him as he stayed there.
 23 Yann Desyeux was allowed to go in to dress and attend to
 24 his wounds.

25 "We were sat in a line around the circular area on

Page 43

1 the outside of the plaza area on the patio area and after
 2 about half an hour they brought out some explosives.
 3 These were in two fairly heavy containers
 4 which we sometimes had to carry around for them. TNT
 5 I believe. That is what the terrorists told us it was
 6 but I'm not an expert. Land mines which were about
 7 a foot in diameter but they didn't have the pressure pad
 8 in the middle and they armed these later by attaching
 9 a golf ball piece of plastic explosive in the centre and
 10 detonation pins. They also had yellow cortex cord about
 11 a quarter of an inch in diameter. They rigged us up
 12 with the cord around our necks and attached us to the
 13 explosives. It appeared to me that if there was an
 14 attempt to rescue us they would blow us up. I do not
 15 know where these containers came from. The terrorists
 16 just walked into the camp carrying them. To my
 17 knowledge there are no explosives on camp so the
 18 terrorists must have brought it with them.

19 "When they placed the yellow cortex cord around our
 20 necks it was slightly haphazard. Some of the time it
 21 was around my neck and at other times it wasn't. It
 22 would be around the necks of the others being held
 23 hostage. After a period of time, possibly an hour, two
 24 terrorists who I am only able to describe as small and
 25 Arab looking, came in from another part of the camp.

Page 44

1 I did not see where from. They picked me up roughly
 2 from out of the group and walked me across the camp.
 3 One of them was carrying a crowbar and at this point I
 4 thought he was going to bludgeon me to death as
 5 I could not imagine why else he was carrying a crowbar.
 6 I was petrified.
 7 "They took me across the site to the JGC fly camp.
 8 They were verbally abusing me all the time saying 'why
 9 do you kill Arabs? Why do you kill Muslims? Why are
 10 you invading our country?' It was only these two that
 11 ever said that and that was from the journey to and from
 12 the fly camp which is another reason why I thought I was
 13 about to get it. Now I feel they were more likely to
 14 have been using me as a human shield. I seem to recall
 15 there was someone else there also being used as a shield
 16 but I can't remember who.
 17 "When I got to the JGC fly camp I saw about 10
 18 Japanese sitting on the floor. They were mainly the
 19 management team for the Japanese contractor but they had
 20 them similarly secured, both hands and feet as we had.
 21 In the group I recall seeing Mr Ito and Mr Aratani.
 22 Both senior managers who were on the site because of the
 23 VIP visit and meetings. They would not normally have
 24 been there.
 25 "I waited there for about 20 minutes before
 Page 45

1 returning. During this time they were discussing
 2 something with other terrorists. I could not hear what
 3 they spoke about. They then dragged me back to the BdV
 4 where I joined the group near the VIP block. It was
 5 apparent during the whole of the time in captivity that
 6 the terrorists had knowledge of who the VIPs were and
 7 who was inside the VIP block and they were particularly
 8 concerned in nailing us. I would class the VIPs on site
 9 as Carlos Estrada, myself, Mark Cobb, Lotfi Benadouda,
 10 Tore Bech and Victor Sneberg. The terrorists made
 11 a point of directing a lot of questions and demands at
 12 us and were more vigilant with us. I was always aware
 13 that I was a target for this reason. My feeling was
 14 also that although this attack may have been a long-term
 15 plan the exact timing had been adjusted to maximise the
 16 number of expats on site. There were extra expats on
 17 site because of the management visit. Also a strike had
 18 ended in December which meant that the expats who had
 19 been evacuated were back on site with a full complement
 20 in the operations team. There was also a fracking
 21 campaign at the site wells which meant there were extra
 22 expats working on that too. About 135 expats of all
 23 nationalities possibly could have been on the site as
 24 opposed to the normally about 70. Not only was the
 25 attack planned but the terrorists clearly had help from
 Page 46

1 people inside the facility. I came to this conclusion
 2 by observing the activity of people assisting the
 3 terrorists.
 4 "During the Wednesday afternoon all of the Algerians
 5 were rounded up and instructed to go and get kit from
 6 their rooms. They were allowed to do this unsupervised
 7 in an orderly and casual fashion. The Algerians mostly
 8 stood around in a big crowd out on the other side of the
 9 plaza area or in the foyer some distance from the
 10 terrorists and most appeared rather wary of the terrorists.
 11 However, there was a distinct group of
 12 about 20 to 30 Algerians who were separate from the
 13 rest. They were clearly very friendly with the
 14 terrorists running errands for them, bringing things for
 15 them, laughing with them and engaging in conversation
 16 with them. They appeared to be helping the terrorists
 17 mainly in the plaza area but from where we were sitting I
 18 could not see them all the time. I recognised one of them
 19 from this group, a large thick set man with a round shiny
 20 smiley face. He was one of the cooks who would serve
 21 us food in the canteen. A long-term member of the
 22 camp. I formed the view that there was effectively an
 23 Al Qaeda cell within the camp.
 24 "My conjecture about the inside help was fuelled by
 25 the way in which the terrorists went through the camp.
 Page 47

1 They showed a lot of inside knowledge in the way they
 2 took out facilities. They knew the way to the
 3 Post de Guard. They knew where to take out
 4 communications in the tower. They knew where to turn
 5 off power. They knew exactly where to look for people.
 6 Especially the location of the VIP block.
 7 "They knew where the offices were and where the
 8 general managers would be. All of this was done very,
 9 very quickly in the dark. They also moved around the
 10 camp in a manner that suggested they had studied the
 11 layout. I don't think they could have done what they
 12 did without information and assistance.
 13 "Later in the afternoon when we were by the wall of
 14 the VIP block this group of Algerians stood near by us
 15 gloating at us. I am not sure how many Algerians were
 16 on site at the time. There will be a list somewhere but
 17 the BdV takes a couple of hundred people and then there
 18 are about 300 in the CC. But that is not an accurate
 19 number.
 20 "The terrorists appeared to bicker amongst
 21 themselves and seemed a little disorganised. As one set
 22 of terrorists took over watch of us they would
 23 re-arrange things and make us sit in a different order
 24 or they would re-arrange the cortex cord around our
 25 necks. They were all quite nervous and a law unto
 Page 48

<p>1 themselves. In retrospect it is my opinion that they 2 all knew it was a suicide mission and they were all 3 mindful of what might happen the next day.</p> <p>4 "Most of the terrorists smoke Arabic amongst 5 themselves and very limited English to us. We tried to 6 speak to them in French. They would only speak back in 7 very basic English. They seemed to prefer not to speak 8 in French. The north American terrorist 3, with whom 9 most of the communications were conducted and who was 10 the one who spoke to Andy Collins on the telephone, he 11 spoke very good English, some described him as being 12 Canadian but I'm not sure he was as Canadians I know 13 have a particular vowel sound which I did not hear in 14 his speech. He could either have been a north African 15 educated in North America or a north American. Most of 16 our communication was with him. He tried to be very 17 nice to us bringing us food and drink, saying they 18 wouldn't kill us, saying they wanted to take us as 19 hostages to Mali to exchange for other terrorists there. 20 I felt as things went on they were just trying to keep 21 us calm and docile until the point when they would want 22 to kill us rather than intimidate us.</p> <p>23 "At first they did not take our mobile phones from 24 us and they let us keep them but later in the day they 25 did take them away but if they wanted us to make a call</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 49</p>	<p>1 or six rockets. After about an hour, around 2 0.7.30 hours, he fired one of these rockets quite close 3 to us out of the camp. I believe he did this to show the 4 military what firepower they had. I later found out 5 that he was perhaps regarded as leader. The terrorists 6 would pray at odd times. Sometimes individuals would 7 just kneel down in the dirt not far from us and do their 8 prayers. In the morning there was a large group who did 9 prayers outside the canteen but that was the only time 10 I saw a group. On this occasion some of the Algerians 11 who I believe were close to the terrorists were amongst 12 them praying. Soon after arriving terrorist 4 set up 13 the rocket launcher about 10 feet from where I was 14 sitting and launched a rocket out of the camp towards 15 the Algerian military. I think it was to show what they 16 had got.</p> <p>17 "It was obviously a very loud bang when he let it off. 18 I was surprised. I didn't see them use these rockets at 19 any other times particularly when helicopters were 20 around.</p> <p>21 "Around midday we were getting very hot sat out in 22 the open so the terrorists moved us all across to the 23 VIP block which was in the shade. They allowed us to go 24 to the toilet escorted. As the day wore on we got 25 colder again and were allowed to bring out bedding,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 51</p>
<p>1 they would bring the phone back that they wanted us to 2 make the call from. When they initially asked us to 3 handover my phone I gave up my international phone, the 4 iPhone, but I kept my local phone so I was still able to 5 send messages on that.</p> <p>6 "From what I saw everyone tried to make phone calls 7 although I am not sure if they were all successful. 8 I was never searched thoroughly and they searched the 9 main pockets of my fleece and took what I had there but 10 none of us were ever thoroughly searched.</p> <p>11 "Whilst secured and seated in the plaza area the 12 white north American terrorist 3 made us make phone 13 calls to senior people in our respective companies as 14 well as to our families and embassies to advise them of 15 the situation, basically that we had been taken hostage. 16 They also told us to demand that the terrorists be 17 allowed safe passage out to Mali and that they planned 18 to take us as their hostages. They wanted publicity and 19 they also asked us repeatedly to demand the Algerian 20 military pull back.</p> <p>21 "The spokesman for communications of the group of 22 terrorists was the north American terrorist 3. He 23 seemed to have control of this area. I never saw one 24 true leader who the others would approach for direction.</p> <p>25 "Terrorist 4 had a rocket launcher with about five</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 50</p>	<p>1 pillows and blankets and quilts. Stephen Green, my HSE 2 team leader was with us. Yann Desyeux was also with us 3 and because of his first aid skills he spent most of his 4 time trying to deal with the injured people and he was 5 allowed to take medical supplies from the clinic. He 6 mainly worked on the comfort of Victor Lovelady who had 7 broken his ankle and Kjell Jan Kversov who had been shot 8 twice and remained in the canteen twice during the 9 incident. I learnt later that Yann had been shot twice 10 in the head and been killed.</p> <p>11 "During the day terrorist 3 made repeated demands for 12 us to make calls to our senior people and demand that 13 the Algerian military pull back. He kept on complaining 14 that the troops were outside and they had tanks. 15 There would be occasional sniping shots from the outside 16 of the camp and they would occasionally shoot back out 17 of the camp. They were clearly agitated that their 18 demands were not being met or acted upon by the 19 Algerian army. We were told by people outside that the 20 message had got through in Algiers but it seemed the 21 local military command was taking no notice of any 22 instructions. Clearly the local military command 23 appeared to be doing anything they felt like. Whilst in 24 the plaza area there was always one terrorist with 25 a detonator to which they had attached the yellow cortex</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 52</p>

13 (Pages 49 to 52)

<p>1 around our necks together with two or three others 2 milling around us but there could have been five or 3 more. They would take breaks and swap over and go away 4 chatting or to say their prayers.</p> <p>5 "The old one who was looking after the rocket 6 launcher was generally always there as was the north 7 American one who was talking to us. I would recognise 8 both of these again. I think I would also recognise the 9 terrorist who was very heavily set who had more of 10 a desert colour camouflage clothing. He was 11 particularly aggressive. I am not sure I would 12 recognise any of the others.</p> <p>13 "Later in the afternoon whilst myself, Carlos and 14 Victor Sneberg were sat in the shaded area of the VIP 15 block the terrorists brought across the Japanese and the 16 Filipinos from the fly camp to join our group. The 17 terrorists were keen to identify who we all were, 18 particularly the VIPs. They had asked us all for ID to 19 prove who we were in the morning and asked if we had our 20 passports. I had not had mine with me then as I don't 21 normally carry my passport around with me on site. In 22 the afternoon when things were stable the north American 23 terrorist asked where mine was. I told him it was in my 24 room nearby and gave the combination of the bag. He 25 went and fetched it. They were all very keen to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 53</p>	<p>1 got colder and colder as the day wore on so they brought 2 out more and more bedding and we made ourselves 3 comfortable.</p> <p>4 "It was mainly the terrorists who got the bedding 5 for us but we did get some ourselves supervised by them. 6 We were able to carry the bedding out even though our 7 hands remained tied. I collected bedding from my 8 bedroom. The terrorists became agitated and irritated 9 by the proximity of the Algerian army and that the were 10 repeated demands they were getting us to make to our 11 seniors for them to move back were not being adhered to.</p> <p>12 "I could not see the army from where I was sitting. 13 The exchange of occasional sniping shots coming into the 14 camp and return fire out continued. The terrorists were 15 very nervous about the gunfire coming in. I do not know 16 how many terrorists were on site in total. I was told 17 by someone that there was 100 but I thought that 18 unlikely. What I have seen heard is there was nearer to 19 30 overall but what I actually saw and counted before we 20 left was 14 at the BdV. All 14 terrorists were dressed 21 similarly. I would describe them as north African in 22 appearance wearing a selection of camouflage battle 23 fatigues, the green and brown type or the desert beige 24 and brown type. They wore Arab Tuareg style head dress, 25 mixed footwear, some wearing trainers, ordinary shoes or</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 55</p>
<p>1 identify our nationalities. There were a few others who 2 were also told to go and recover their passports. 3 Carlos did because his was in the VIP block and the 4 accommodation was nearby but those whose accommodation 5 was much further away were not asked to go and recover 6 theirs.</p> <p>7 "Terrorist 3 would inspect the passports and write 8 all the details in a little notebook he had on him. 9 They would then talk amongst themselves about the 10 details in the book. I felt like they were trying to 11 sort out the order in which to shoot people. He wrote 12 a lot of information in the book but I don't know what 13 he was writing. He seemed to be the only one doing 14 this. Terrorists would bring us drinks and food, 15 biscuits, yogurt and apples, whatever they could find in 16 the canteen. Mainly the north American one and some of 17 the younger ones. They ate the same food as us.</p> <p>18 "Whilst sat there the terrorists were initially 19 happy for us to talk a little. As the afternoon wore on 20 they seemed more irritated by that and certainly by 21 night when they were looking out for possible attacks 22 they wanted us to be quiet. Generally we could still 23 whisper to each other quietly so were able to 24 communicate with each other. It was uncomfortable 25 sitting in the dirt and I had previously mentioned we</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 54</p>	<p>1 boots. All had automatic weapons, a small rucksack, 2 a water bottle and a vest with some grenades in it. 3 They ate and drank very little but they ate and drank 4 what was available such as biscuits, juice and yogurt 5 like the rest of us. I never saw any of the terrorists 6 changing clothes with each other or the hostages.</p> <p>7 "I did not take any pictures with the iPhone I lost 8 as I considered that too risky. I did not manage to 9 take any video recordings nor am I aware of anyone else 10 who may have.</p> <p>11 "About 6.30 pm there was a reorganisation for the 12 night. About half were moved to the circular meeting 13 area between the VIP and the clinic, marked 2 on page 8 14 on the map, and the other half were moved inside the 15 round area in which we were originally sat beside. 16 I was in the group that was taken to the area between 17 the VIP block and the clinic.</p> <p>18 "Once settled on the wall inside the circle near the VIP 19 block with as much bedding as we could find we lay 20 down quietly for the night. There were about 15 to 20 21 of us there. I recall Kenneth Whiteside being with me, 22 as was Carlos Estrada, Stephen McFaul and Sebastian 23 John. During the night it was very cold and we were 24 very frightened so we did not sleep much. We just lay 25 there trying to comfort one another. The terrorists</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 56</p>

1 drove the Toyotas down to the fence and left the engines
 2 running all night with the headlights facing out of the
 3 fence into the desert to guard against intruders. The
 4 noise of that and the light stopped us from sleeping.
 5 During the night the Algerian army kept up sniper fire.
 6 We were all still being guarded typically by about two
 7 terrorists on rotation while the others were out on the
 8 perimeter. I thought that if the Algerian army were
 9 going to mount any sort of operation to free us it would
 10 be late at night. I was expecting some form of attack
 11 at the usual time you would expect, say 4 or 5 am in the
 12 morning, but as morning approached and after the
 13 terrorists had sat up awake all night things became
 14 really tense and we realised there was not going to be
 15 any attack or attempt to free us.

16 "I feel this may be a good point to mention two
 17 details which I forget. The terrorists in the afternoon
 18 frequently took pictures and video footage of us, mainly
 19 with a small camera. The terrorists who took these
 20 pictures varied. They also had two cloth banners. One
 21 was white and one was black. They taped one of them on
 22 the VIP wall above our head. The banners were probably
 23 4-foot by 3-foot with Arabic writing on them but I was
 24 unable to understand it.

25 "This would be visible in any of the pictures they

Page 57

1 were taking. The other one they taped up like a flag to
 2 one of the light poles. I think it was the particularly
 3 large aggressive one who had produced both of the
 4 banners from his rucksack and put them up. This all
 5 happened early in the afternoon shortly after we had
 6 been moved across to the VIP block. They only put these
 7 banners up and started taking pictures after we had been
 8 moved.

9 "I think it may have been mostly video footage
 10 taken. I don't know whether these images were published
 11 outside or on the internet but there may be footage
 12 available. This may give exact information on numbers
 13 and individuals. I felt their purpose for taking the
 14 pictures was to get it published somewhere on the media.
 15 They stood about 10 or 15 feet away from us when they
 16 were filming and would pan across us to show the group
 17 in general to show how many of us there were. I don't
 18 know where that camera went.

19 "Each terrorist from what I saw carried what looked
 20 like an automatic assault rifle and they seemed to be
 21 fairly modern assault rifles although I am not an
 22 expert. A few of them had what I would recognise as
 23 Kalashnikovs. One had a heavy machinegun which had
 24 a two part support at the front end of the muzzle and
 25 also had a metal ammunition box so it was quite a heavy

Page 58

1 machinegun. The terrorist with the heavy machinegun
 2 kept it at all times but I cannot describe what he
 3 looked like. They had one RPG launcher which I never
 4 saw them use and one rocket launcher with about five to
 5 six rockets. I saw a photograph in the press when it
 6 was all over and it looked like all of these rockets
 7 were still there.

8 "Also on their ammunition vests they had small
 9 grenades. I didn't see them use a grenade. I did see
 10 them fire automatic weapons. Terrorist 3 and terrorist
 11 4 had small books that they would often write in and
 12 I saw them on occasions have conversations and refer to
 13 whatever was written in the book. They seemed to have
 14 either a walkie-talkie or a satellite phone. I knew the
 15 general communications had been taken out because our
 16 mobile phones were not working and this was the general
 17 method now that they would communicate with each other.
 18 They communicated in Arabic not in French. I have
 19 a feeling they had other groups in the field and they
 20 were communicating amongst each other.

21 "After dawn as it got progressively lighter the
 22 occasional gunfire from out of the camp increased.
 23 There was some heavy rounds which the terrorists said
 24 were 50 millimetre cannons. I don't know if that is true
 25 or not but there were heavy rounds coming in over

Page 59

1 our heads.

2 "The terrorists seemed to be expecting some form of
 3 attack but were still getting increasingly nervous.
 4 They were starting to arrange themselves in anticipation
 5 of an imminent attack. There was an increase in gunfire
 6 around us. The terrorist 3 made us make further phone
 7 calls on the satellite phone to senior people to say
 8 that this would be the final chance to tell the Algerian
 9 military to move back. He then got Al Jazeera on the
 10 phone and briefed us to make a statement to them. This
 11 was along the lines of all the other calls we had made
 12 calling for the military to move back and requesting
 13 a safe passage to Mali. The statements to Al Jazeera
 14 were mainly made by myself and Stephen McFaul. We
 15 repeated that we had been taken hostage and that the
 16 terrorists wanted safe passage to take us to Mali. They
 17 also wanted the Algerian military to move back and we
 18 tried to say some nice things about them too. We were
 19 told what to say albeit we were not given a script.

20 "The call went on for some time, ten minutes and we
 21 tried to be kind about the terrorists in the hope that
 22 it would please them and it would help us.

23 "At 08.30 the terrorist 3 said to me that they were
 24 going to start shooting hostages at 10 am. In an hour
 25 and a half and he said I was going to be the first. He

Page 60

1 said 'we're not killers, we don't want to shoot you but
 2 if they don't back off we will shoot you.' In his words
 3 they had no option as the army would not pull back.
 4 So they were going to start shooting hostages at
 5 10 beginning with me. I was understandably very upset
 6 by that and I made preparations with Carlos Estrada as
 7 to what I wanted him to do for my family if they carried
 8 out the threat. There was a mixture of emotional
 9 goodbyes and practical things. Carlos tried to comfort
 10 me. He said that whilst I might be the first he was
 11 sure this was going to happen to everyone. At this
 12 point I was so emotional I can't remember specifics
 13 about our conversation. We kept this to ourselves and
 14 tried to maintain a sense of calm as we were the senior
 15 management and didn't want others to start panicking.
 16 I didn't break down emotionally. I was almost too upset
 17 to do that. I was very shocked and sombre and thought it
 18 can't end like this. The 10 am deadline passed and
 19 probably by about 10.30 it was clear they were not going
 20 to do what they had said but by now the threat had
 21 affected me badly.
 22 "During the next couple of hours some heavy rounds
 23 came in and helicopters began flying around. It was
 24 a the Mig 24 Hind helicopters. I am not sure if there
 25 were one or two in the air. They circled and made low
 Page 61

1 passes. This seriously worried and irritated the
 2 terrorists. At one point one of the helicopters hovered
 3 over us very close and fired in heavy rounds at the
 4 foyer and the clinic and maybe the restaurant as well.
 5 They were extremely loud cannon shells and appeared to
 6 be a demonstration of strength from the Algerian army.
 7 "At this point we were very worried that they would
 8 actually turn the fire on us as a group. The terrorists
 9 were shaking their fists and firing a few ineffectual
 10 machinegun shots in the air. It was making the whole
 11 group very, very nervous. They didn't move us during
 12 this fire. We were out in the open the entire time.
 13 Around midday they moved us back into the meeting area.
 14 We all stood up and they arranged us in nationality
 15 groups, Americans, British, Japanese and Filipino
 16 et cetera. The Japanese and Filipinos were the biggest
 17 groups. The Japanese included Mr Maekawa, Mr Aratani
 18 and Mr Ito. I think terrorist 3 now gave way to
 19 terrorist 4. Since the latter now seemed to be telling
 20 people what to do they frequently referred to their
 21 little books. It was chaotic.
 22 "We were stood out in the open in these groups for
 23 about two hours until about 14.00-hours. At this point
 24 I counted 35 expats and 14 terrorists. That excluded
 25 the wounded man inside the canteen. I could be one or
 Page 62

1 two out but I think that is a fairly accurate number.
 2 At this point Yann Desyeux was not with us and neither
 3 was Fred Buttaccio.
 4 "During this two hour period the terrorists seemed
 5 to rework the explosives placing some in each of the
 6 vehicles. They had brought up about half a dozen Toyota
 7 Landcruisers which were from the JV large fleet of
 8 vehicles permanently on site. The vehicles were all
 9 left hand drive and white in colour. The vehicles for
 10 the operations team have a big IA on the side for
 11 In Amenas. I don't remember any other livery or
 12 markings on the vehicles.
 13 "They parked the vehicles in a circular fashion
 14 around area 3. They shot out the glass from the rear
 15 and side windows. I think this may have been to give
 16 them the capability to shoot out. There were lots of
 17 arguments among them about what they were going to do
 18 next. These were the only vehicles I saw the terrorists
 19 use so I don't know how the terrorists had travelled to
 20 the site. As we approached 14.00-hours we were moved
 21 into the vehicles. Typically there were ten people
 22 packed very closely into each vehicle with a suicide
 23 bomb in each. Typically the bomb was a land mine about
 24 a foot in diameter. A ball of plastic explosive about
 25 golf ball size was in the middle. Attached was the
 Page 63

1 yellow cortex card cord to a detonator which had two
 2 pins. The terrorists made these devices up around us
 3 but I can't remember who did it. Maybe two or three
 4 terrorists made the bombs. They seemed to be fairly
 5 proficient and seemed to know what they were doing.
 6 They seemed to have a limited amount of explosives which
 7 had been carted around all the time. The mines appeared to
 8 be very dusty and had cracked case.
 9 "My vehicle was made up as follows: front seat from
 10 left to right, terrorist driving, terrorist in the
 11 middle and Stephen Green on the right. In my row in the
 12 back seat was the terrorist 3 who had the suicide bomb
 13 on his lap, then me, then a terrorist, then
 14 Carlos Estrada. Then in the boot there was
 15 Iain Adamson, Stephen McFaul and at least one terrorist.
 16 There could have been another but I was pinned in and
 17 could not see behind me. I think there were at least 10 in
 18 my vehicle. I produce NMH1, a diagram showing the
 19 position of people in my vehicle.
 20 "As we sat in the vehicles the terrorists were
 21 getting agitated and they were chewing on khat sticks
 22 shouting 'Allahu Akbar'. They were hugging and praying,
 23 saying goodbye to each other. I was quite sure this was
 24 a suicide mission now. On a personal front having been
 25 completely terrorised previously and for over two hours
 Page 64

1 been thinking I was going to be shot I was unable to get
 2 any more upset. I was actually fairly calm. I had made
 3 my peace and prayed for my family. I was resigned to
 4 die at that point.
 5 "Carlos and I had discussed this during the night.
 6 We had already tried talking to the terrorists to try
 7 getting alongside them but we didn't see any way out.
 8 We thought we would certainly die at this point.
 9 I didn't see any of the Algerian staff leave the base
 10 but I think before we left on the suicide run convoy the
 11 terrorists let them go. While I didn't see this happen
 12 it concerned me that some of the terrorists could have
 13 got out with this group.
 14 "At 14.00-hours the vehicles moved off in convoy.
 15 It was all rather chaotic. They were bumping over
 16 curbs, going through tight spaces and getting stuck.
 17 They passed out of the BdV to the left of the
 18 guardhouse. They got so stuck around the guardhouse
 19 that the Algerian army who must have been on the other
 20 side of the road started shooting at us. Some of the
 21 shots must have hit us while we were stuck there.
 22 Eventually the vehicles got out on to the road.
 23 I believe there were six vehicles but I don't know who
 24 was in the other vehicles. I was only aware who was in
 25 mine. Up to this point I hadn't seen anyone fatally

Page 65

1 injured. They drove in a wild and crazy way far too fast.
 2 I felt it was deliberate as opposed to just bad driving.
 3 They had difficulty driving in a straight line and it was
 4 actually terrifying being on the road with them. They
 5 came out by the guardhouse and instead of going down
 6 the access road they went through a hole in the fence
 7 which must have been purposely cut. They cut across
 8 the car park and drove through the sand and on to the
 9 road turning left towards the CPF. They continued to
 10 drive down the road in a line towards CPF very fast
 11 towards. My vehicle was possibly vehicle 4 in the
 12 convoy.
 13 "The Algerian army must have been on the right side
 14 as all the bullets came from that direction. The terrorists
 15 asked us to stick our hands out of the window and wave
 16 like mad as a display to the army that they had hostages
 17 and they would use us as a human shield.
 18 As we came down the road we were hit by a hail of
 19 bullets, it was just an incredibly deafening sound as the
 20 bullets hit the sound of the car. I think people on the
 21 right-hand side of the car probably died from that. I
 22 know that Carlos Estrada died of multiple gunshot
 23 wounds and he was certainly on that side. This is what
 24 I heard after the incident, so he could have been hit at
 25 this point. It is possible some of the shots came from

Page 66

1 the left but I can't be sure about that. I also saw in the
 2 press that the helicopter gunships had attacked the
 3 cars. I don't think that happened. The calibre of the
 4 rounds coming in was too small and I didn't notice any
 5 rounds coming through the roof. I really thought we'd
 6 had it. It was all over for us at that point but after
 7 we got beyond the Algerian army I realised I was still
 8 alive. The terrorists were still shouting 'Allahu
 9 Akbar' really loud. I understand this to mean 'God is
 10 great'. They were getting more and more wild and
 11 nervous. As we came down to the lay down areas all of
 12 the cars in front appeared to veer off the road to the left.
 13 In my opinion this was a deliberate move. I then saw
 14 one of them turn over. It was extremely frightening. I
 15 then remember our vehicle overturning and we ended
 16 up near the corner of the fence near the
 17 operations lay down area near the slug catcher. So when
 18 I got out of the vehicle we were at the corner fence,
 19 marked 'our car' at the page 2 of the map. It felt as
 20 though our vehicle had hit a ridge and turned over and
 21 landed on the roof very hard. I wasn't wearing a seat belt
 22 so I think I thought that was going to be it. The vehicle
 23 landed upside down and we paused for just
 24 a moment and then terrorist 3 must have detonated the
 25 suicide bomb. I didn't see him do it but he was the one

Page 67

1 with the bomb.
 2 "There was a very loud bang and everything was
 3 silent. I was deafened. I could only see black.
 4 I felt my vision shrink to a small purple dot.
 5 I thought I was dead. I came around after an unknown
 6 period of time and was aware that I was upside down in
 7 the vehicle. I looked down and saw a large wound in my
 8 left arm and wrist. It was a very deep wound and was
 9 fizzing, possibly from the explosive. I became conscious
 10 that my other limbs were all working but my clothes
 11 were shredded. I looked over my right shoulder and saw
 12 that the vehicle was on fire. I was very afraid of dying in
 13 a burning vehicle so I kicked something out of my way.
 14 I didn't look to see what it was but
 15 I managed to get out. I have no memory of anyone else
 16 being in the vehicle. I had tunnel vision and my
 17 hearing was damaged. I didn't see anyone's face.
 18 I don't have any recollection at all of what or who was
 19 in the vehicle at this stage. I didn't see any of the
 20 terrorists get out of the vehicle that I had been
 21 travelling in before it overturned. I didn't look back
 22 into the vehicle to check on the condition of people
 23 there. I don't know why I didn't do that. So the
 24 terrorists who came after us later with gunfire could
 25 have been from our vehicle. I knew we had left

Page 68

1 Stephen Green and Carlos in the vehicle. But I could
 2 not say if they were still alive at this stage as
 3 I never checked. I don't know why I didn't register the
 4 faces of people when I got out of the vehicle and
 5 I don't know why I didn't look back into the vehicle.
 6 It just feels like I was in shock after the explosion
 7 and a natural focus on a fight to survive.
 8 "I dropped out of the vehicle on to the desert. My
 9 legs were working and my right arm was working but I had
 10 enormous pain in my left arm. I then saw that
 11 Iain Adamson and Stephen McFaul had also got out of the
 12 boot of the vehicle. No one else got out. We sort of
 13 paused. There was no discussion. We just smiled and
 14 looked at each other in shock and amazement and I think
 15 one of us or all of us said 'I can't believe we got out
 16 of that.' I was beginning to think we were nearly safe
 17 at this point.
 18 "There was a realisation that we had to move away
 19 from the vehicle. I believe the yellow cord and plastic
 20 explosive might have gone off in our vehicle and caused
 21 the explosion but the land mine hadn't. I had come to
 22 this conclusion because as we walked past three vehicles
 23 that had been blown out it was clear the land mine had
 24 exploded in them. All that remained of the vehicles was
 25 the floor plan. There were body parts and offal around

Page 69

1 it. It was a horrific scene. Three of us then found
 2 one Filipino called Joseph Balmaceda who was in pretty
 3 good shape. He had a head wound and we later found out
 4 his hearing was damaged. I was amazed he got out of the
 5 vehicle. As far as I know the four of us were the only
 6 ones who walked off the desert. Iain took Joseph's
 7 shirt and tore it up to make a rough bandage for my arm.
 8 We went through the other vehicles to see if we could
 9 help. There was one Filipino man on the floor with very
 10 bad injuries but we couldn't move him albeit there was
 11 some sign of life. On top of one vehicle were the
 12 remains of a man I believe was Mr Kawabata because he
 13 was stocky with Japanese overalls on but all of his
 14 limbs had been blown off. In the boot of the other
 15 Toyota were two Filipinos. They were crushed together
 16 in the metal and we couldn't pull the metal apart to
 17 release them. We soon realised it would be better to
 18 make a mental note of the location of anyone with life
 19 signs and get the military to go back to help them once
 20 we got to safety.
 21 "By the time we had got to the third vehicle we
 22 could hear shots coming towards us. We became aware
 23 that one of the terrorists must have survived and seen
 24 us and he was now trying to take us out. We had to move
 25 away very quickly away. I moved toward the fence as

Page 70

1 there was a trench which provided some cover and
 2 I continued moving up towards the lay down area. The
 3 others moved across the desert. I moved quickly but
 4 there was a lot of pain in my arm. There were still shots
 5 coming across. We then ran towards the army waving
 6 our arms. I had a mixture of feelings about this because
 7 less than 30 minutes before we had been shot at
 8 badly by the army and perhaps it may have suited them if
 9 none of us got off that desert alive that day. I wasn't
 10 sure if they were friendly.
 11 "We finally got to a small group of soldiers with an
 12 officer amongst them. They had two vehicles, one was
 13 a jeep, like a Gendarme vehicle, and the other had an
 14 open back with a machinegun on the back of it. The army
 15 was returning fire at the terrorists. I felt like this
 16 lone terrorist was pinning us all down including the
 17 army so I made the judgment that the Algerians weren't
 18 very competent with their weapons. We had no
 19 conversation with the army. They just told us to keep
 20 down. I hid down behind the front wheel of the jeep.
 21 The incoming fire felt like it was coming from a heavy
 22 machinegun. Albeit I didn't have a look as I was taking
 23 cover behind one of the vehicle wheels.
 24 "We later moved back towards a wadi and remained
 25 there out of sight until they dealt with the lone

Page 71

1 terrorist who was shooting at us. Myself, Iain,
 2 Stephen McFaul and Joseph looked at each other in
 3 amazement. How did we get out of that? We were
 4 beginning to think how did we get out and we were nearly
 5 safe at this point. We didn't have a discussion. We
 6 just smiled at each other completely shocked. We waited
 7 for a few minutes until the firing stopped. I assumed
 8 they must have managed to take the terrorist out. They
 9 then put us in the machinegun carrier fairly roughly and
 10 drove us to the main group of Algerian soldiers. There
 11 were about a dozen officers in the main group of
 12 Algerians near one of the fracking lorries for the
 13 fracking operation which they seemed to use for
 14 protection because it is such a big solid vehicle and
 15 they were able to hide behind it.
 16 "They had ambulances and some police Gendarme
 17 vehicles. In the distance there were some tanks. We
 18 were taken to the army field surgeon. He cut the
 19 clothes away from my left right side and put rudimentary
 20 dressings on. I knew about the injury to my left wrist
 21 already but the surgeon discovered a bigger one under my
 22 elbow. They also cut away my trousers to look at the
 23 explosive burns to my left thigh. The surgeon said it
 24 was superficial and did not need to treat it.
 25 "I was and am troubled by the security situation and

Page 72

<p>1 confused about how only 30 terrorists got in under the 2 nose of 150 Gendarmes. I am also confused about why 3 when they got our messages out to our senior people in 4 Algiers there seemed to be no connectivity between those 5 and the army groups on the ground. The local military 6 seemed to be doing just what they wanted to do. 7 I didn't see anyone injured or fatally injured by any 8 shots from the Algerians. I just heard the bullets hit 9 the car. When the aircraft came over and were firing on 10 us whilst in the camp I didn't see anyone injured there 11 either. They were just flying to one side to the buildings 12 just making a show of strength. 13 "When in the 4 by 4 the terrorists were shooting 14 their guns whilst in the car but I'm unaware of any 15 discharge within the vehicle. The terrorists were 16 holding their guns out of the window and shooting in the 17 air, more a gesture of defiance." 18 MS DOLAN: Mr Charnock, can you just turn to page 29 of the 19 statement. 20 MR CHARNOCK: Yes. 21 MS DOLAN: Just one piece to read at the top of page 29. At 22 the paragraph that begins "I read the Times" on the 23 first line. 24 MR CHARNOCK: Yes: 25 "The 2-hour 40 minute flight to London was fairly Page 73</p>	<p>1 "General comment. My normal living/working areas at 2 the [In Amenas] site were all located in the protected 3 central area of the IA field, within which it was 4 generally believed to be safe for expat movements during 5 daylight hours. These areas comprise: 6 "The BdV 'Base de Vie' accommodation area. 7 "The CPF 'Central Processing Facilities' area. 8 "IACP '(In Amenas Compression Project) facilities 9 construction area adjacent to CPF. 10 "IACP slug catcher construction area adjacent to 11 CPF. 12 "IACP offices and equipment/materials lay down area 13 between BdV and CPF. 14 "IACP camp construction area adjacent to BdV. 15 "Concrete batching plant adjacent to BdV-CPF road. 16 "My duties did not require me to venture further 17 afield and since excursions required justifications for 18 an escort I did not visit other areas. 19 "Question 1: In December 2012 and January 2013 did 20 you ever see armed guards/Gendarmes at VCP1 and/or VCP2 21 or were they unarmed? 22 "Answer: On visit to site 1 I would pass VCP1 only 23 twice on the way in at around 15.00-16.00 in the 24 afternoon and on the way out around 05.45 in the 25 morning, so my impressions are limited to these brief Page 75</p>
<p>1 uneventful. I read the Times on the way and was struck 2 by how many erroneous details were in the editorial. 3 I do not recall the exact article I read in the Times on 4 the plane as I read others later that were also 5 erroneous but certain things I recall were that the army 6 was supposed to have gone into the BdV but they never 7 went in. I read that the helicopter gunships had 8 attacked the cars on the road but from the calibre of 9 the shots coming in and the fact that none came through 10 the roof I don't think that happened either." 11 MS DOLAN: Thank you. I think there were additional 12 questions that Mr Hitch answered. Sir, I know you need 13 to finish at 11.30. This is a page and a half. 14 THE CORONER: That's all right, yes, certainly let's do 15 that. 16 MR CHARNOCK: I have two. I have one entitled "Questions 17 for Mr N Hitch" and one "Re: Mr Stephen Green." Is it 18 the two lots? If I can start with the questions for 19 Mr Hitch: 20 "The questions asked relate to the general security 21 situation rather than specific incident details which 22 I personally witnessed. I have answered as far as I am 23 able given much of the subject matter was not part of my 24 accountabilities or daily itinerary on site. 25 "Armed guards and Gendarmes. Page 74</p>	<p>1 observations. I never visited VCP2/3. At VCP1 I only 2 ever saw unarmed civilian guards at the VCP1 drop arm 3 barrier. 4 "I do however recall armed guards at La Reculee 5 checkpoint at junction of site access road and the main 6 In Amenas to Illizi highway. There were armed guards at 7 the drop arm barrier and in a small sandbagged guard 8 point beside a chicane near the adjacent T junction. 9 "Please refer to graphic below layout of 10 checkpoints. 11 "Question 2: Did any Gendarme/guards at VCP1 and 12 VCP2 remain on duty 24 hours day and night or did they 13 guard for a shorter period? 14 "Answer: I am not aware of guard duty rosters. 15 "Questions 3: Did you see or hear any daily or 16 nightly armed patrols by the Gendarmes/guards around the 17 perimeter of the site? If there were any, how often did 18 they occur during the day? How often during the night? 19 "Answer: I did not see any perimeter patrols as 20 these areas are not visible from my normal 21 living/working areas. 22 "Question 4: Did you see or hear nightly armed 23 patrols by the Gendarmes/guards around BdV? If there 24 were any, how often did they occur during the day? How 25 often during the night? Page 76</p>

<p>1 "Answer: I have never seen any armed patrols, armed 2 persons or arms within the BdV and cannot recall seeing 3 any armed patrols around the BdV perimeter fence. 4 I have occasionally seen Gendarmes vehicles moving 5 around but did not have the impression that these were 6 patrolling." 7 The heading: "Any extra precautions on arrival of 8 VIPs". 9 Question: Did you see or here any commencement of or 10 increase in armed patrols around the BdV when Mr Estrada 11 and other VIPs arrived? 12 "Answer: I am not aware of any change to security 13 arrangements when the VIP party arrived. The security 14 arrangements were generally discussed as being adequate 15 for expats or not and differentiation by rank/importance 16 of persons was not considered appropriate. The only 17 differentiation of which I am aware was that the 18 US/European expats were considered more of a target for 19 terrorists than expats from the Far East (ie Japanese, 20 Filipinos etc). Unfortunately it became clear during 21 the incident that all expats were viewed equally 22 legitimate targets by the terrorists. 23 "Question: Did you see or hear of any commencement 24 of or increase in the number of armed guards at the VCPs 25 when Mr Estrada and the other VIPs arrived?"</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 77</p>	<p>1 imminent more credible was noted but US warning gave 2 grounds for concern nonetheless. 3 "The attached images". 4 "Question: On the attached image (at appendix A) there 5 are a number of tracks showing leading from the desert 6 towards BdV and the CPF. Ignoring the one N3 which 7 had VCPs (marked A), were any of the other tracks 8 (marked as B to F or elsewhere) passable by 9 Landcruisers? 10 "Answer: I cannot comment on this point as I did not 11 visit any of these areas. 12 "Question: Please can you mark on the attached image 13 (at appendix A) where the 'operations lay down area' and 14 the 'slug catcher' are located on this image? Where the 15 vehicle you were a hostage in overturned and ended up? 16 "Answer: Please refer to marked up drawings provided 17 to Metropolitan Police SO15 with my statement (contact 18 Detective Sergeant Lesley O'Connell). 19 "Regarding rigs/locations at In Salah, 20 Hassi Messaoud, Hassi Farida locations 5 and 6, 21 Rig T212, BP Weatherford Rig 802 and Enafor rig 20. 22 "Were you aware of armed guards/Gendarmes living in 23 the accommodation camps in any of the above 24 rigs/locations in or before January 2013? If so, at 25 which rigs/locations?"</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 79</p>
<p>1 "Answer: No, as above. 2 "Question: Was an armed guard escort given to the 3 VIPs inside BdV? 4 "Answer: No. 5 "Discussion at BP headquarters. 6 Question: You mentioned discussions at BP 7 headquarters and on site about the Mali situation and 8 'spill over' risks to the facility. Did any of the 9 discussions consider a risk of armed men in Landcruiser 10 type vehicles driving into the site to take hostages? 11 Were you ever involved in a discussion about how the 12 facility would protect would protect itself against such 13 a vehicle based attack? 14 "Answer: I believe the para referred to occurs on 15 page 7 of my statement. I was not involved in any 16 discussion which considered the specific risk of an 17 attack and hostage taking at site as the local security 18 perimeter was considered to be reliable. Our main 19 concerns were attack on the site to airport and 20 In Amenas town road journeys outside the secure 21 perimeter at site. There was also concern about SAM 22 attacks on flight operations at In Amenas airport 23 following US embassy warnings the year before. 24 A briefing put out by the British embassy in Algiers, 25 shortly after, saying that the threat was neither</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 78</p>	<p>1 "Answer: I cannot comment on this point as I did not 2 visit any of these areas and was not involved in rig 3 operations." 4 There are then a series of questions posed on behalf 5 of Mr Green. And they were questions which relate to 6 Mr Hitch's recollection of matters involving what 7 appears to have been Stephen Green's last moments before 8 he was killed. Mr David Green would be grateful for any 9 answers Mr Hitch could provide. 10 "Question: [Do you] recall seeing Stephen before 11 Mr Hitch was loaded into the vehicle at the BdV? 12 "Answer: Yes, I was held hostage with Stephen and 13 saw him throughout our period in captivity until we were 14 loaded into the convoy vehicles. However, he was very 15 subdued throughout and would not engage in any 16 conversation with me. 17 "Question: [do you] recall seeing Stephen Green 18 being loaded into the vehicle into which Mr Hitch was 19 in? 20 "Answer: Yes, he was placed in the front right-hand 21 side passenger seat in the same vehicle as me. I was on 22 the back seat so I could clearly see him in front of me 23 and I reached forward to touch his left shoulder with my 24 right hand and say something comforting before we left 25 the BdV.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 80</p>

20 (Pages 77 to 80)

1 "Question: [Did he] know Ruben Andrada well?
 2 "Answer: I did not know him at all.
 3 "Question: [Do you] recall being given along with
 4 others an instruction to place his hands out of the
 5 window of the vehicle?
 6 "Answer: Yes, we were given this instruction and to
 7 wave our arms as much as possible as we exited BdV on to
 8 main site road and just before the army opened fire.
 9 "Question: Recall if so if Stephen complied with
 10 this instruction?
 11 "Answer: In the confusion it is not possible to say
 12 specifically whether Stephen did this but I believe we
 13 all obeyed the instruction as it seemed helpful for our
 14 survival.
 15 "Question: [Did you] hear anyone specifically being
 16 told to place their hands out of the window?
 17 "Answer: I recall that the instruction was general,
 18 not addressed to any one person.
 19 "Question: [Did you] notice anyone comply with this?
 20 "Answer. Ditto 4.
 21 "Question: [Did you] recall seeing Stephen Green
 22 turn around at any time during the convoy to the CPF?
 23 "Answer: No, and it would have been very difficult
 24 for him to do this jammed as he was between two
 25 terrorists.

Page 81

1 "Question: [Did he] recall hearing Mr Adamson shout
 2 'adroit' to the terrorists driving?
 3 "Answer: No.
 4 Question: Did Mr Hitch see Stephen after terrorist
 5 detonated the IED?
 6 "Answer: No, I did not recognise anyone inside the
 7 vehicle after the IED was detonated. When I regained
 8 consciousness the interior of the vehicle was darky and
 9 smoky and I was deeply shocked from the explosion and my
 10 injuries. When the vehicle caught fire I concentrated
 11 on escaping and when outside I totally ignored the
 12 vehicle and anything in it.
 13 "Question: Did Mr Hitch see Stephen Green after Mr
 14 Hitch exited the vehicle?
 15 "Answer: No, ditto 10.
 16 "Question: Did the vehicle end up on its roof?
 17 "Answer: Yes, and as the front of the vehicle had
 18 been flattened by the roll-over the rear was elevated.
 19 "Question: How did Mr Hitch exit the vehicle?
 20 "Answer: Upside down the vehicle was easier to exit
 21 as it was possible to slide across the flat surface of
 22 the roof. I saw an area of sunlight at a broken window
 23 and slid feet first towards it kicking an obstacle out
 24 of the way. I eased myself out through the window feet
 25 first.

Page 82

1 "Question: did you look back?
 2 "Answer: No, ditto 10."
 3 THE CORONER: I am going to have to break off there but
 4 thank you very much. If there is anything else that
 5 arises out of that or consequential upon it we'll deal
 6 with it first thing tomorrow. We will start tomorrow at
 7 10.20.
 8 (11.40 am)
 9 (The inquest adjourned until the following day at 10.20 am)
 10
 11 MR DAVID GREEN (sworn) 1
 12 Questions from MS DOLAN..... 1
 13 Questions from MR OWEN-THOMAS..... 7
 14 Questions from MS GOLLOP 11
 15 Further questions from MR OWEN-THOMAS..... 12
 16 Statement of MRS NICOLA JOHN (read)13
 17 Supplementary statement of MRS NICOLA JOHN25
 18 (read)
 19 Statement of CLAUDIA GAVIRIA (read)26
 20 Statement of MR NICHOLAS HITCH (read)31
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 22
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Page 83

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